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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
.ARTHUR 0. NAUJOKS and 
GERTRAUDE NAUJOKS, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
EMIL SUHRMANN, dba SUHR-
MANN'S SOUTH TEMPLE MEAT Case No. 8775 
COMPANY and ALBERT NOORDA 
and SAM L. GUSS, dba JORDAN 
MEAT & LIVESTOCK COMPANY 
and VALLEY SAUSAGE COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the 
record. The Appellants will be referred to as the Defend-
ants.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In making the Statement of :B-,acts defendants do 
not recognize the rule that in view of the verdict and 
judgment for plaintiffs the evidence must be viewed 
most favorably for plaintiffs. They leave out much of the 
evidence that is important. 
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For example, they failed to disclose to the Court the 
fact that the partners of the Jordan Meat & Livestock 
Company are the sole owners of the stock of the Valley 
Sausage Company. These two concerns are really one. 
The Jordan Meat buys the meat products and sells 
these meat products to retail outlets. Valley Sausage 
Company was formed to carry on the sausage business 
of the Jordan Meat. The raw materials necessary for 
making sausage are "sold" by Jordan Meat to Valley 
Sausage and then Valley Sausage "sells" the product 
to Jordan Meat, which in turn sells to the retail out-
lets. 
In another instance the defendants show the conflict 
in testimony relating to whether or not Hoffman assisted 
and instructed the Suhrmanns in the smoking of mett-
wurst. The jury found against defendants (Interroga-
tory 4, R. 176) and this Court should, under the law, 
consider the conflict in favor of plaintiffs here. This 
would mean that for purposes of appeal it is an estab-
lished fact that Hoffman did assist and instruct the 
Suhrmanns in the smoking of the mettwurst. 
Under the facts as found by the jury, Emil Suhr-
mann purchased mettwurst in an unprocessed state (that 
is, not treated for the purpose of killing trichina) from 
the Jordan ~feat & Livestock Company, which company 
had in turn obtained it from the Valley Sausage Com-
pany, the manufacturer which in turn had obtained it 
from Jordan Meat. Alfred Hoffman advised and assisted 
Emil Suhrmann in smoking the mettwurst and in doing 
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so he was acting as the agent of the Jordan Meat and 
the Valley Sausage Company. At the time the Jordan 
Meat sold the raw mettwurst sausage to Suhrmann, it 
actually knew and as a reasonably prudent person should 
have known, that Suhrmann intended to sell the mett-
wurst to the public without processing it so as to kill 
trichina. At the time Valley Sausage Company manu-
factured and delivered the raw mettwurst to Jordan 
Meat it actually knew as a reasonably prudent person 
should have known, that the mettwurst would be 
sold and delivered by Jordan Meat to Suhrmann and 
Suhrmann would sell it to the public without processing 
it to kill trichina. The plaintiffs ate mettwurst infested 
with trichina purchased from Suhrmann which, in turn, 
had been manufactured by Valley Sausage and sold to 
Suhrmann by Jordan Meat. As a result of eating this 
mettwurst plaintiffs contracted trichinosis. 
The foregoing statement of facts is taken directly 
from the special verdict returned by the jury (175-178). 
The foregoing are the ultimate facts established under 
the evidence and found by the jury and upon which 
plaintiff is entitled to recover in this cause. The detailed 
testimony introduced supports all of these findings. 
We will refer to the details of the testimony as it be-
comes applicable in answering the arguments of defend-
ants. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S ANSWERS 
TO QUESTIONS 5 AND 6 OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT. 
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POINT II. 
A SPECIAL VERDICT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
AND THERE WAS NO NEED TO GIVE THE REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS OF EITHER PLAINTIFFS OR DEFEND-
ANTS. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
POINT IV. 
THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DIS-
MISS THE CROSS-COMPLAINT OF SUHRMANN AND SUB-
MITTING THE ISSUES THEREIN TO THE JURY IN NO 
WAY A F F E C T S THE JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFFS 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S ANSWERS 
TO QUESTIONS 5 AND 6 OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT. 
This point, as argued in defendants' Brief, really 
contains two distinct and separate propositions. In order 
to treat the matter in an orderly fashion we are setting 
forth these two propositions under this point. 
Defendants here contend that there is no evidence 
to sustain a finding that Hoffman was the agent of the 
defendants. The next separate and distinct proposition 
is that there is no evidence to support a finding that 
defendants knew, or as reasonably prudent persons, 
should have lmown, that Suhnnann intended to sell the 
mettwurst to the public without processing it to kill 
trichina. 
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The jury made these findings which are in favor of 
plaintiff's position. Hence, the evidence must be con-
sidered in a light most favorable to plaintiffs in de-
termining whether these findings are supported. All 
conflicts in testimony must be resolved on appeal in 
favor of the jury finding and the Court must draw all 
reasonable inferences from the facts which tend to sup-
port these findings. The defendants, in their brief, have 
totally ignored this very fundamental rule which governs 
an appeal from a judgment rendered in an action at 
law. 
1. Hoffman an agent of defendants. 
As heretofore pointed out, the Jordan Meat & Live-
stock Company and the Valley Sausage Company are 
integral parts of one business operation which has for 
its purpose selling meat and meat products to retail 
outlets. No money changes hands between these com-
panies, but merely bookkeeping entries. Both companies 
are owned lock, stock and barrel by the same individuals. 
(246-249). Alfred Hoffman was normally employed by 
the Valley Sausage Company as a sausage maker ( 463, 
490). Because of language difficulties, when Suhrmann 
would call to place orders he was referred to Hoffman. 
( 494). Practically all of the business dealings regarding 
the sale and purchase of meat between Suhrmann and 
defendants was conducted through Hoffman (306, 494). 
In spite of the denial by N oorda that Hoffman had 
anything to do with selling ( 463) he admitted he knew 
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that Hoffman had a conversation with Suhrmann and 
Hoffman asked N oorda if "we would take and make the 
sausage, blood sausage, liverwurst and mettwurst for 
Suhrmann" ( 464). N oorda replied that "we would make 
it for anyone." ( 464). Thus we have a situation where 
the first contact in connection with the sale of meat 
to Suhrmann was had through Hoffman and this was 
brought to the attention of the defendant N oorda. 
This, together with the fact that Noorda knew Hoff-
man was taking orders for meat products from Suhr-
mann, establishes that he knew Hoffman was actively 
engaged in selling and N oorda, by not stopping him, 
approved of such activity. This attitude on Noorda's 
part makes common sense. The ultimate object of Valley 
Sausage and Jordan Meat was to sell their products 
and anyone in the organization would certainly be ex-
pected to assist in achieving that objective just as Hoff-
man did. The end of April or first part of ~Iay, 1955, 
Suhrmann was informed by Hoffman that defendants 
were not going to deliver mettwurst any longer (306). 
Suhrmann then went to the defendants' plant and there 
saw both Hoffman and Noorda. Hoffman, in the pres-
ence of N oorda, stated that he would be unable to deliver 
mettwurst because all the ovens were used for hot cook-
ing and they had no facility for cold sn1oking the pro-
ducts (307). Suhrmann testified that at this meeting 
(307): 
"A. I make then the suggestion to :Mr. Hoffman 
and told him I had an oven which I could 
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use and maybe we could do the cold smoking 
in my store. 
Q. And then what was said~ 
A. It seems to me that Mr. Hoffman didn't like 
the idea. 
Q. Well, what did he say~ 
A. I can't remember the words only that I had 
the impression he would not accept my propo-
sition. 
Q. Was anything else said in the conversation~ 
A. Well, Mr. Noorda told me "We will do any-
way." 
Q. And then was anything else said~ 
A. We agreed finally that the company should 
bring the raw wurst, ready to be smoked, to 
my place and we should do the cold smoking." 
From this we see that Mr. Hoffman took an active 
part in the conversation and was not merely a conduit 
of German. Hoffman even made the arrangements with 
Suhrmann for giving credit for shrinkage of the mett-
wurst in processing it (313). Noorda was aware of this 
arrangement for shrinkage because he testified that 
that was one of the conditions under which Suhrmann 
was to smoke the mettwurst ( 465, 492). Suhrmann had 
had no experience in smoking mettwurst and he talked 
with Hoffman about how it should be done (307). Suhr-
mann testified as followE: (308): 
"Q. Do you recall whether or not Mr. N oorda 
was present~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
A. It is possible, but I am not quite sure about it. 
Q. Do you remember then anyone other than 
Mr. Hoffman and yourself being present~ 
A. Mr. N oorda would be the only person being 
present. 
Q. Now tell us what was said~ 
A. I inquired what is this cold and hot smoking, 
what it really was, and he instructed me on it 
and told me how to proceed. 
Q. And what did he say~ 
A. He told me as soon as the wurst is in the 
oven the temperature must not. be above 80 
degrees. 
Q. Was anything else said about how to do it~ 
A. When I talked to him he said a few degrees 
more, maybe five, or even ten would be the 
limit, and if it would go higher, about 90 
that would spoil it and ruin the wurst." 
On May 19, 1955, the first mettwurst was delivered 
to Suhrmann under this new arrangement (311, Exhibit 
P-1). 
Hoffman himself delivered the ~Iettwurst to Suhr-
mann on May 19th. Suhrmann testified (318, 319) : 
"Q. Now on tllis first occasion again, that ~Ir. 
Hoffn1an cmne, on the 19th of :May, you say 
he cmne in the afternoon as I understood you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who started the fire, who started the 
s1noldering of the sawdust~ 
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A. I think it was Mr. Hoffman. 
Q. Did Mr. Hoffman come back that night, did 
he leave and then come back to check up on 
this smoking1 
A. At this first time he came back before I 
closed my shop and again told us to be very 
careful and have it cold smoke. And he told 
me to touch the wurst, the wurst must be 
cool. 
Q. Did he tell you anything to do in the event 
it was not. 
A. Only he told me to spray water on the saw-
dust.'' 
Mrs. Suhrmann confirmed this testimony ( 354, 355). 
Hoffman's assistance in this smoking was in line 
with the understanding that Suhrmann had with N oorda 
and which understanding is reflected by the following 
testimony elicited by defendants' counsel from Suhrmann 
on cross examination (331): 
"Q. Now, I want to know what was said about 
the arrangements made in connection with 
this smoking by you and what 1\ir. N oorda 
said about it. 
A. The agreement was this : That the meat com-
pany would deliver the sausage made except 
the process of smoking, deliver it in my busi-
ness and I would smoke it for them and the 
company had to pay. 
THE REPORTER: I can't hear you. 
A. The agreement was this, the company would 
deliver in my business a quantity of mett-
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wurst ready made up to the process of smok-
ing and I should do the smoking in my oven 
for and on behalf of the company and I would 
accept the price that the company make to 
me." 
In further confirmation of the fact that this work 
of Hoffman's was in line with the agreement between 
N oorda and Suhrmann was the testimony that some of 
the mettwurst smoked by Suhrmann was to be returned 
to the Jordan Meat. Suhrmann testified (315,316): 
"Q. I want you to direct your attention to a con-
versation that you had about smoking more 
mettwurst than you would use, did you have 
only one such conversation¥ 
A. No, It happened several times. 
Q. When was the first time as nearly as you 
can put it¥ 
A. He has no recollection - ask my wife. 
Q. Was it before or after, or on the 19th of :May? 
A. After May 19th. 
Q. Can you remember where the first conversa-
tion took place 1 
A. I can't remember it, but my wife surely will 
remember. 
Q. Do you remeinber the conversation you had 1 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Will you tell what was said 1 
MR. BAYLE: Just a moment, 'Ye would like 
to know the ti1ne of this conversation. He says he 
doesn't know but his wife knows about it, and I 
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assume his wife is the one that talked to the 
party we are now speaking of. 
THE COURT: I think he said he then pur-
sued it and he said it was after May 19th, that 
is the closest he could put it. I don't know whether 
you have asked whether anyone else was present, 
Mr. Roberts, I think he is entitled to have that. 
Q. (By Mr. Roberts). Was anybody else present 
besides you and Mr. Suhrmann ~ 
A. Several times Mr. N oorda was present when 
I talked to Mr. Hoffman. 
Q. Was Mr. N oorda at one or more of these 
conversations that was had about smoking 
more mettwurst in your oven than you would 
use~ 
A. Except that this was a conversation over 
the phone, he was present. 
Q. Were each of these conversations on this 
subject about the same? 
A. Everytime that he was expected to smoke 
more than he really needed for himself, they 
advised him beforehand and asked for per-
mission. 
Q. By "they" who do you mean? 
A. The firm, Jordan Meat and Livestock Com-
pany. 
Q. Who was there, what individual, would you 
talk to all individuals? 
A. To Mr. Hoffman. 
Q. Now, will you tell us what was said? 
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A. Naturally after more than two years I cannot 
recollect every word which was spoken, but 
the essence is this: The gentlemen would tell 
me we have so and so, so much additional 
wurst to smoke and we will bring it over 
to your establishment and you will be kind 
enough to smoke it, call us by phone and we 
will pick it up, and each one, or two of these 
people would come to the factory and you 
can bring it back to us." 
And, as a rna tter of fact, mettwurst was returned on 
a number of occasions to defendants and invoices were 
made out showing credit for these returns (318). Also, 
invoices were introduced showing the sale of this mett-
wurst hy Jordan Meat to customers Brinksma and Ling-
man (Exhibits P-15 and P-19). We submit that the fore-
going testimony supports the finding that Hoffman was 
acting as the agent of defendants in assisting and ad-
vising Suhrmann in the smoking of the mettwurst saus-
age. Suhrmann did not know how to smoke n1ettwurst. 
In order to sell this meat product it was essential that 
he be instructed in the details of this work. In further-
ance of that objective Hoffman showed him how to per-
form this process. N oorda denied that Hoffn1an had 
anything to do with the selling end of the business. The 
evidence, however, is to the contrary. It establishes 
without question that Hoffman was engaged in taking 
orders from Suhr1nann and making deliveries of nlett-
wurst to Suhrn1ann. He participated in the discussions 
concerning 1nettwurst delivered to Suhrmann on and 
after May 19th and his activities in overseeing the s1nok-
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ing was in line with the understanding between Suhr-
mann and Noorda. 
In Schneider v. Suhrmann, (not yet reported) the 
evidence on this question was substantially the same and 
this Court stated that evidence on this question was 
eompleting this holding in effect that this evidence would 
support a finding of Hoffman's agency. 
2. Defendants knew, or shou,ld have known, Suhr-
mann would not process mettwurst to kill trichina. 
The supported finding that Hoffman was the agent 
of defendants in assisting and advising Suhrmann in 
smoking the mettwurst establishes the defendants' knowl-
edge that Suhrmann did not intend to process the mett-
wurst for the purpose of killing trichina. It is estab-
lished that there are three methods of killing trichina. 
One is by freezing, another by heating to a temperature 
of 137° F., and the third, a salt curing method (503). The 
latter two methods were not even considered by defend-
ants or Hoffman and Hoffman participated in the cold 
smoking of this mettwurst and by that he meant a tem-
perature in the vicinity of goo F. (537-53g). He told 
Suhrmann that the temperature could be a little 1nore 
than goo, but that if it would go higher, to say 90, it 
would spoil and ruin the mettwurst ( 30g). This type 
of smoking would not raise the temperature high enough 
io kill trichina. This being the only processing Suhr-
mann was to do, the defendants, through their agent 
Hoffman, knew that Suhrmann would not process the 
mettwurst to kill trichina. 
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Even without this agency of Hoffman the evidence 
would establish that defendants knew, or should have 
known, that Suhrmann would not process the mettwurst 
to kill trichina. According to N oorda, one of the reasons 
the defendants discontinued smoking mettwurst for Suhr-
mann was that they did not desire to cool their ovens 
down to the point necessary to kill trichina. 
' POINT II. 
A SPECIAL VERDICT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
AND THERE WAS NO NEED TO GIVE THE REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS OF EITHER PLAINTIFFS OR DEFEND-
ANTS. 
If the court below had submitted the case to the 
jury on a general verdict, then it would have been neces-
sary to give the instructions requested by the parties. 
However, the court concluded to submit the matter on a 
special verdict wherein the jury resolved the issues 
of fact. After the jury had returned its verdict making 
these findings, the court then applied the law to the 
·facts so found and rendered a judgment. in favor of 
plaintiffs and against the defendants. 
The jury found that plaintiffs contracted trichinosis 
from eating trichina infested mettwurst bought frmn 
·the defendant Suhrmann, who in turn purchased it from 
the other defendants who in turn had manufactured 
the mettwurst. The jury further found that the defend-
ants through their agent Hoffn1an assisted Suhrmann in 
the smoking of the mettwurst. The jury also found that 
the defendants knew that Suhrmann did not intend to 
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do anything to the mettwurst which would kill trichina. 
With these facts before it, the court of necessity returned 
a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. 
Defendants refer to seven requested instructions 
which they claim were error not to give. Defendants do 
not discuss these instructions separately and it should 
be obvious that any discussion on their part could only 
lead to the result that the court properly rejected these 
instructions in view of the fact that it submitted the 
case on a special verdict. 
Defendants' Requested Instruction No. 9 states that 
if the plaintiffs' contracted trichinosis due to circum-
stances beyond the control of the defendants or as a 
result of the negligent acts of others, such as Suhrmann, 
then the verdict must be against plaintiffs. 
This instruction is erroneous in two particulars. 
First, there is no evidence to support any finding that 
there were circumstances beyond the control of the de-
fendant Valley Sausage, and second, the negligence of 
Suhrmann would not be the sole cause of the damage 
to plaintiffs and could not be an intervening cause, be-
cause, as found by the jury, the defendants knew that 
he was going to smoke the mettwurst without doing 
anything that would kill trichina. The jury found that 
plaintiffs' trichinosis was not due to circumstances be-
yond defendants' control. 
By requested instruction No. 2, defendants sought 
to have the court advise the jury of the statutes of the 
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State of Utah and then to instruct the jury that if it found 
plaintiffs purchased the sausage from defendant Suhr-
mann and did not expressly or by implication make 
known to the defendant Valley Sausage that the mett-
wurst was to be eaten in a raw, uncooked or unprocessed 
condition, they should find in favor of the defendant 
Valley Sausage. Everyone knew that mettwurst would 
not be cooked by the consumer. It is a product which 
is ready for consumption upon sale. The jury found that 
Valley Sausage knew that Suhrmann would not process 
the mettwurst to kill trichina. Hence, defendant Valley 
Sausage knew that nothing would be done to kill trichina 
and therefore, so far as this mettwurst was concerned, 
it was ready for human consumption. Nothing was to be 
done to eliminate trichina. Under the findings of the 
jury defendant Valley Sausage warranted that the mett-
wurst was fit for consumption because it was then, except 
for smoking, in condition to be eaten. This requested 
instruction is clearly inapplicable here. 
Defendants' requested instruction No. 13 was prop-
erly refused for the reason that it is a mandatory "no 
cause of action" instruction and only considers the plain-
tiffs' right to recover on the grounds of negligence. It 
is not necessary to establish negligence in a warranty 
case. The jury found the Inett\nust was infested with 
trichina. This would constitute a violation of Section 
40-20-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and would be negli-
gence per se. Skerl v. lr'illolr Creek Co,al Company, 92 
Utah 47+, 69 P. 2d 502; Tr'ilcox v. Trunderlicll, 73 rtah 
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1, 272 P. 207. Hence, this instruction was inapplicable. 
See Troi'eto v. G. H. Hammond Co., 110 F. 2d 135; 
Leonardi v. Habermann Provisi'on Co., 143 Ohio St. 623, 
56 N.E. 2d 232; Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 ~font. 63, 
181 Pac. 326. 
The need to give defendants' requested instruction 
#14 was eliminated by the finding of the jury that the 
defendant assisted in smoking the mettwurst through 
their agent Hoffman and by the finding that defendants 
knew there would be no further processing by Suhrmann 
to kill trichina. 
Defendants' requested instruction #20 was covered 
by the finding that the defendants knew Suhrmann would 
not process to kill trichina. Everyone admitted that the 
mettwurst would be eaten by the consumer without 
cooking it. This is not like the sale of pork chops or a 
pork roast. In that situation, a person would expect the 
meat would be properly cooked. Here, the mettwurst 
was a spread which was not to be cooked or further 
processed by the consumer. 
Defendant's requested instructions #22 and #25 are 
not applicable. They ignore the situation present in the 
case at bar. Defendants prepared the mettwurst knowing 
no further steps would be taken to eliminate trichina. 
It was only to be smoked and so far as the trichina 
was concerned it was in exactly the same condition as 
it would be when sold to the consumer. The facts found 
by the jury rendered these two instructions inapplicable. 
None of plaintiff's requested instructions on the 
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so-called theory of the case was given to the jury. The 
reason is obvious. The court submitted the facts to the 
jury and the court applied the law. The authorities sub-
mitted by the defendants are not in point. 
Defendants' authorities are not helpful. 
In Chili v. Cudahy Brothers Co., 267 Mich. 690, 255 
N.W. 414, plaintiff sought to recover both on negligence 
and breach of warranty. He was not permitted to recover 
on either. He did not prove negligence and the court held 
there was no implied warranty that pork is fit for human 
consumption in a raw state. The plaintiff purchased 30 
pounds of fresh pork butts at defendant's retail store. 
Great stress was laid on the fact that defendant did 
not know that the pork was to be used in making raw 
sausage. It is uncontradicted in the case at bar that the 
mettwurst would be eaten by the consumer without cook-
ing it. Defendants knew that no steps had been taken 
to eliminate trichina and they knew that nothing 
further would be done after the product left their hands 
to eliminate trichina. Their agent assisted in the smoking. 
This case widely differs from the Chili case where the 
pork sold was such that it would be cooked before eating, 
while here it would be eaten in the condition it was in 
when delivered by the retailer. Defendants knew what 
this condition would be. 
Defendants refer to the case of Dressler v. Merkel, 
Inc., 284 N.Y. Supp. 697 (affinned on appeal, -1 N.E. 2d 
744) as being directly in point. Here again defendants 
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are stretching things considerably. In that case the de-
fendant was a wholesale dealer in pork products. It sold 
pork shoulders and back fat to one Ehring who operated 
a butcher shop. He in turn made this into mettwurst, 
which was smoked but not cooked. There was no find-
ing in that case or any suggestion that defendant knew 
what was to be done with the pork products it sold to 
the retailer. In the case at bar, we have the situation 
where defendants made th~ Inettwurst up to the point 
of smoking. Everything was done by them except that 
process in getting this product ready for human con-
sumption. Defendants participated and supervised thi~ 
last step through their agent Hoffman. Smoking only 
changes the flavor and these defendants knew that so far 
as elimination of trichina was concerned the mettwurst 
was ready for human consumption. 
In Eisenbach v. Gimbel Brothers, 281 N.Y. 474, 24 
N.E. 2d 131, plaintiff ate pork tenderloin at defendant's 
restaurant. The suit was against the defendant restaur-
ant and it impleaded its vendor, a wholesaler. This whole-
saler impleaded its vendor, a packer. The verdict was 
against the defendant and the court instructed that if 
the verdict was against the defendant restaurant, then 
the defendant restaurant and its vendor were in turn 
entitled to judgments in their favor. The jury found that 
the chef at the restaurant had improperly cooked the 
pork. The case at bar is entirely different because there 
was to be no cooking of this mettwurst. There is no ques-
tion here of improper cooking. The basis of the court's 
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holding that the defendant restaurant was not entitled 
to judgment was that such recovery would not be per-
mitted upon the principle that a party cannot recover 
for a loss that he could have averted by reasonable care. 
·In the case at bar defendants knew that Suhrmann 
would not cook the mettwurst and hence failure to cook 
would not be an intervening cause. Also in that case the 
one defendant was precluded from recovery because of 
its own contributory negligence and here plaintiffs seek 
judgment against all defendants and contributory negli-
gence of one defendant will not bar judgment against 
him or the other defendants so far as plaintiff is con-
cerned. 
Defendants say that since an inspection for trichina 
or a test for their presence is unknown, failure to make 
the same is not negligence. There never has been any 
claim by plaintiffs that this was the negligence relied 
upon. The sale of trichina infested pork constituted a 
violation of the Utah Statutes and is hence negligence 
per se without more. Also, a warranty is hereby involved 
which again necessitates no negligence. 
Defendants contend that the warranty to be implied 
is a warranty that the food will be fit for human con-
sumption when processed or used in the customary 
and proper manner. We have no quarrel with tllis rule. 
In the first place, the mettwurst was to be eaten "ith-
out further cooking. No one could anticipate that Inett-
wurst would be cooked. The important thing is that de-
fendants when they prepared and sold this 1nettwurst 
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knew that it must then be fit for human consumption 
with the exception of smoking. They warranted that it 
was in such condition. 
vVhere a special verdict is submitted to a jury, it 
is not customary for the trial court to instruct the jury 
as though a general verdict would be returned. It may 
well be that had a general verdict been submitted, in-
structions something like those requested by defendants 
would have to be given, but here the facts were found 
by the jury and the law was applied by the court thus 
eliminating the necessity of an explanation to the jury 
of the law. 
We believe the court followed both the language 
and the spirit of Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
in submitting this case to the jury. If counsel had desired 
any further issues submitted to the jury, it was encumb-
ant upon him to frame such and request it. He made no 
such request. Rule 49 in such event provides as follows: 
"* * * If in so doing the court omits any 
issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the 
evidence, each party waives his right to a trial 
by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the 
jury retires he demands its submission to the 
jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand 
the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do 
so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in 
accord with the judgment on the special verdict." 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
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The basis of defendant's argument under this point 
is that there was no evidence that any act or omission 
to act by defendants proximately caused plaintiffs to 
contract trichinosis. This in turn is based upon the propo-
sition that the negligence of Suhrmann was an interven-
ing act which was the sole cause of plaintiffs' illness. 
The findings of the jury completely refute this 
argument. Defendants placed in the channels of com-
merce mettwurst containing trichina, knowing that Suhr-
mann would do nothing to kill same and knowing the 
consumer would not cook the product. Also their agent 
participated in and supervised the smoking process per-
formed by Suhrmann. Under this latter situation if Suhr-
mann was negligent so were defendants through their 
agent and the act of their agent could not be an inter-
vening cause. 
The conduct of Suhrmann in not processing the 
mettwurst to kill trichina was foreseeable. The jury 
found that defendants knew Suhrmann would not so 
process it. Under the law this prevented such conduct 
from being an intervening cause. In Prosser on Torts 
(2nd Ed.) 268, the rule is stated as follows: 
"If the intervening cause is one which in 
ordinary human experience is reasonably to be 
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason 
to anticipate under the particular circumstances, 
he may be negligent because he has failed to 
guard against it . . . 
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved 
from liability by the fact that the risk, or part 
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of the risk, to which he has subjected the plain-
tiff has come to pass. Foreseeable intervening 
forces are within the scope of the original risk, 
and hence of the defendant's negligence. The 
courts are quite generally agreed that such inter-
vening causes will not supercede his responsi-
bility." 
The act of defendants in placing the trichina infested 
mettwurst in channels of commerce did not come to rest 
until eaten by plaintiffs. The affect of that act was a 
continuing one. The act of defendants and Suhrmann 
concurred to cause the illness of plaintiffs. 
As stated in Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104 Utah 110, 138 
· P. 2d 639 (1943). 
"The conduct of Babcock and Ehalt - and 
the latter when he assumed Babcock's position 
by the understanding between them also assumed 
his duties if in fact he did not have an inde-
pendent duty to watch the gauge - in neglecting 
to attend to the water in the boiler was simply 
a continuation of the conduct of the predecessor 
crew. It was an added and continued negligence 
of the same type and not an independent nor an 
intervening cause. The whole conduct of prede-
cessor and successor crews was of a piece. An 
independent intervening agent such as to break 
the causal connection between right and wrong 
according to Bohlen on ·Torts, page 29, must be 
(1) independent, self created, not itself the pro-
duct of the wrongful act; (2) it must intervene; 
(3) "It must divert and not merely hasten natural 
effect of the wrong." 
This Court then quoted Judge Sanborn in Union 
Pac. R. Co. v. Callagan, 56 Fed. 988 as follows: 
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"The independent intervening cause that will 
prevent a recovery on account of the act or ornis-
sion of a wrongdoer must be a cause which inter-
rupts the natural sequence of events, turns aside 
their course, prevents the natural and probable 
result of the original act or omission, and pro-
duces a different result, that could not have been 
reasonably anticipated. The concurrent or suc-
ceeding negligence of a fellow servant or a third 
person which does not break the sequence of 
events is not such a cause, and constitutes no 
defense for the original wrongdoer, although, in 
the absence of the concurrent or succeeding negli-
gence, the accident would not have happened." 
Jordan v. Coca Cola Co., 117 Ut. 578, 218 P. 2d 660 
( 1950) is not remotely analagous to the case at bar. 
That case involved drinking from a bottle of Coca .Cola 
containing flies and other impurities. Plaintiff obtained 
the bottle from an automatic dispensing machine. He 
relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur which is 
not involved in the case at bar. The court refused to 
apply this doctrine because the cap of the bottle could 
be removed and replaced without detection and it was 
not shown there had been no opportunity to do so. In 
fact, the court held, it was shown there were numerous 
opportunities to tamper with the bottle. 
Under the foregoing authorities we submit the con-
duct of Suhrmann was neither the sole proximate cause 
of plaintiff's illness nor an intervening cause. Defend-
ants' act was a proximate cause of that illness. 
Under the facts of the case plaintiffs were entitled 
to recover upon the ground defendants violated Sections 
4-:20-5 and S, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Do·naldson v. 
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Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 186 Ga. 870, 199 S.E. 
213, 128 .A.L.R. 456; annotations 128 .A.L.R. 464 and 28 
A.L.R. 1384; Troietto v. G. H. Hammond Co., 110 F. 2d 
135; Leonardi v. Habermann Provision Co., 143 Ohio St. 
623, 56 N.E. 2d 232; Kelly v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 
63, 181 Pac. 326 . 
.Also plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the 
ground of breach warranty. Walters v. United Grocery 
Co., 51 Utah 565, 172 Pac. 473; Decker & Sons v. Capps, 
139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828, 142 .A.L.R. 1479; Weide-
man v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210; McSpedin v. 
Kunz, 271 N.Y. 131, 2 N.E. 2d 513, 105 A.L.R. 1497; 
Greco v. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E. 2d 557, 115 
A.L.R. 1020; Charles v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. 2d 
199; Swengil v. F & E Wholesale Grocery, 147 Kan. 555, 
77 P. 2d 930. 
POINT IV. 
THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DIS-
MISS THE CROSS-COMPLAINT OF SUHRMANN AND SUB-
MITTING THE ISSUES THEREIN TO THE JURY IN NO 
WAY AFFECTS THE JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFFS 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
The issues of this case were presented to the jury 
on interrogatories contained in a special verdict. Certain 
of the interrogatories related to the issues between plain-
tiffs and defendants, others related to the issues between 
defendant Jordan Meat, defendant Valley Sausage on 
one side and defendant Suhrmann on the other. 
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To have submitted these latter issues could not have 
been error, prejudicial or otherwise. The defendants do 
not point out in what particular there was any prejudice 
to them. No confusion could have resulted because the 
interrogatories are clear, simple and concise. They sep-
arate the issues between the various parties. 
Defendants cite the answer to Interrogatory No. 
9 as showing confusion. The jury could have found, and 
did, that while defendant Suhrrnann did lose business 
there was no satisfactory proof as to the amount. 
We submit that permitting the jury to answer ques-
tions concerning the rights of Suhrrnann could not pos-
sibly affect the answers made to the interrogatories 
relating to the rights of plaintiffs. 
·-· CONCLUSION 
The jury found all issues in favor of plaintiffs. 
~Those findings are supported by the evidence and the 
findings in turn support the judgment. The verdict ac-
complishes justice between the parties and the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RA \VLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS 
& BLACK, CANNON & DUFFIN 
Counsel for Respondents 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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